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assage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB)
Act, also known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act, is just the latest step
in the “relentless process of eroding the
constraints placed on the financial marketplace
during the Great Depression.” So says President
Santomero in this issue’s Third Dimension. In
addition, President Santomero sketches the history
of financial services law since the 1930s. He then
looks at the impact that GLB — especially its
creation of financial holding companies — has had
and will continue to have on the financial services
industry.
In reality, “financial moderni-
zation” is not an event or a law; it is the
dominant theme of the past 50 years of
American finance. It signifies the
erosion of arbitrary constraints that have
divided the financial marketplace since
the Great Depression. Therefore,
describing the causes of financial
modernization requires beginning then.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
was enacted to protect consumers and
the economy from the conflict of
interest that, conventional wisdom held,
contributed to the Great Depression. By
separating deposit-taking activity from
the underwriting of securities, the Glass-
Steagall Act created a highly
regimented financial services landscape.
Commercial banks were limited to
lending and deposit gathering. Thrifts
were mortgage lenders. Investment
banks served as underwriters and
brokers of both stocks and bonds. And
insurance firms had the profitable niche
of actuarial products. Additional
constraints were geographic in nature.
Congress left in place a framework that
encouraged state prohibitions on bank
branching, leaving county and state
borders as geographical boundaries on
banks.
Congress should have
anticipated the deterioration of the neat
pigeonholes to which the financial
industry was relegated. While useful in
augmenting consumer confidence
during the Depression, the boundaries
became increasingly anachronistic in
post-war America. Market pressure to
expand product offerings and consumer
desire to better meet financial needs,
coupled with legal ingenuity and
effective lobbying, were too powerful to
allow these market constraints to survive
indefinitely. Supplemented with the
capabilities of computers and
telecommunication, the evolutionary
pace of financial-sector convergence
accelerated greatly. By the 1970s, the
very nature of banking had been
changed forever.
In corporate finance, large,
stable firms like General Motors and
General Electric had long been the
banking industry’s best customers. But
by the 1970s, many corporations found
borrowing from banks to be less efficient
than issuing direct capital market
obligations. Bond traders could use
computer technology to assess the merits
of noninvestment-grade bonds, and they
saw their industry boom at the expense
of bankers. Innovative nonfinancial
firms developed their own capacity to
finance consumer debt by directly
tapping the capital market, and they cut
banks out of the loop.
At the same time, consumers
no longer saw their traditional local
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balances. While they generally relied on
a community bank or thrift for home
mortgage loans, many consumers sought
better returns for deposits through more
sophisticated instruments. What was
formerly deposited in a checking or
savings account was now likely to be
invested in a money market mutual
fund or a cash management account or
directly into securities. The money
market mutual fund industry, which
could not exist prior to computerization,
held billions of dollars by the 1970s.
Traditional lenders, witnessing
the drop in corporate and consumer
deposits as well as loan demand, were
eager to offer new products and find
new sources of revenue. Technology did
empower commercial banks to offer
some new products and conveniences to
their customers, such as the expanded
use of credit cards, ATMs, and phone
banking. But government often blocked
their ability to compete within their
traditional customer bases. Regulation
Q, for example, forbade banks from
offering competitive rates on checking
accounts. Trying to stay competitive,
many banks offered a completely new
banking product — the toaster — as an
incentive to open an account.
Such obstacles left bankers
demanding relief through relaxed
regulation, entry into new markets, and
the ability to expand more freely across
state borders. The government’s
response was to give them all three.
Action began at the state level
when Maine enacted legislation
permitting out-of- state entry. At the
national level, Congress allowed banks
to offer more competitive interest rates
on deposits in 1980, ending the ill-
conceived era of toaster banking. The
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 allowed
banks to cross state boundaries to
acquire troubled banks. The Federal
Reserve permitted bank holding
companies to acquire discount securities
brokers in 1983. In 1987, the Fed blessed
limited securities underwriting under
the bank holding company umbrella —
then expanded the limits in 1989 and
again in 1996. The Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994 removed
constraints on bank holding company
acquisitions across state lines and also
permitted banks to branch interstate if
permitted by state law. Interstate and
regional banking had begun in earnest.
By the mid-1990s, the process
of evolutionary convergence had
transformed the financial services
landscape. Commercial banks were
brokering insurance and underwriting
securities subject to percentage caps.
Insurance companies, many of which
had merged with investment banks,
offered new risk-management products
with all the characteristics of securities.
Home mortgages were packaged into
securities. Thrifts, credit unions, and
commercial banks offered similar
consumer products to their
members. The money market provided
more efficient transfers of capital. Major
commercial firms had their own finance
companies or even a thrift. And with
mergers and acquisitions, the size of
financial conglomerates swelled to
unprecedented new levels.
These developments made
economic sense. In many cases they
were the only rational courses of action
that could be taken by Congress, the
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, or
individual states. But these actions
stretched the credibility of the rules.
Often, the rulings of bank regulators
seemed like reversals of established
policy, because bank products emerged
despite regulatory prohibitions or
regardless of precedent. Now terms such
as “nonbank banks” and “the facilitation
of commercial paper placement”
entered the lexicon. And as complexity
rose, smaller institutions found
themselves at a competitive
disadvantage. By the mid-1990s, large
sections of federal banking law
resembled relics of a bygone era.
The contrast between the
inadequacy of existing legislation and
the reality of a new financial services
paradigm was made clear in April 1998
when Citicorp and Travelers Group
proposed a $70 billion merger. The
creation of Citigroup — America’s
largest financial conglomerate, with
businesses ranging from banking to
insurance to securities underwriting —
demonstrated the inadequacy of the
legislative and regulatory patches of the
previous 20 years. Congress knew it had
to stop debating financial laws and
respond. Within a year, both the House
and the Senate had passed legislation to
bring our financial laws into the modern
age. With President Clinton’s signature
in November 1999, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley (GLB) Act, also known as the
Financial Services Modernization Act,
became law.
          GLB provides a unified legal
framework that standardizes financial
convergence. Its centerpiece is the
creation of an entity called a financial
holding company, or FHC. Once a
financial organization obtains the FHC
designation, it can house a complete
family of financial activities through
distinct affiliates. Each affiliate is still
overseen by its traditional functional
regulator. The Federal Reserve
Traditional lenders, witnessing the drop in
corporate and consumer deposits as well as
loan demand, were eager to offer new products
and find new sources of revenue.  Business Review  Q4 2001   3 www.phil.frb.org
continues to oversee the FHC, much as
it oversees all the bank holding
companies, or BHCs, of both yesterday
and today.
However, while GLB
established a new legal framework for
financial convergence, it did not change
the underlying realities driving the
marketplace. Technology,
demographics, and customer needs are
the forces that have determined and
will continue to determine the structure
of the financial services industry.
But while GLB will not change
the nature of the industry, it will bring
the financial services industry to
convergence in a more expeditious and
orderly manner — but one that still
holds a few surprises. For example,
before GLB was enacted, some
predicted that many banks and other
financial service organizations would
quickly seek FHC status and begin
offering “one-stop shopping” for
financial services to their target
customers. It’s been about 18 months
since organizations could apply to
become FHCs. Thus far, things have not
turned out as predicted.
As of August of this year, less
than 20 percent of top-tier bank holding
companies had converted to an FHC.
The percentage of investment banks,
brokerage houses, and insurance
companies that converted is much
smaller.
Not surprisingly, the largest
multi-product institutions have led the
way. Before GLB, these large
organizations were constrained from
pursuing a “financial supermarket”
strategy, so they acted swiftly to
maximize that opportunity.
A number of relatively small
banks and small bank holding
companies also have found reason to
obtain FHC status. Indeed, fully two-
thirds of current FHCs have assets of less
than $500 million. These institutions
sought this status not because they have
immediate plans to expand their product
offerings, but because the designation
presented a relatively low-cost option for
future expansion. In general, these local
or regional BHCs have less complex
corporate structures and are well-
capitalized. So, getting the
designation proved relatively easy, and
these institutions will be prepared for
good future opportunities.
Nonetheless, only a small
percentage of the total number of firms
many suspected would be eager to
benefit from the new law have chosen
to seek the designation. Why have so
few financial firms elected to become
FHCs? Why has the pace
of cross-industry
acquisition been so slow?
Undoubtedly, there are
many reasons why more
financial institutions have
not rushed to obtain a
designation that allegedly
allows them to be all things
to all customers. However,
one seems particularly
relevant.
Perhaps I am too
much of an economist, but
I believe that many
institutions have done a
simple calculation. They
have already adapted to
BHC structure. They have
been successful in
delivering financial
services to their market
area through a
combination of bank and
nonbank subsidiaries, coupled with the
increasing use of strategic alliances and
outsourcing. Their operating structures
are in place and have been effective.
By contrast, I believe that
many of these institutions see no
immediate benefits of converting to an
FHC and remain uncertain as to the
longer term implications of FHC status.
Over time, the potential
benefits of the FHC structure will be
clarified by developments both in the
marketplace and in regulatory
pronouncements. Circumstances will
illustrate whether the added flexibility
afforded institutions operating under an
FHC charter offers additional, exclusive
profit opportunities. Meanwhile,
regulatory policies and procedures will
reveal the parameters under which
FHCs must operate.
A number of the detailed
regulations necessary to implement
Gramm-Leach-Bliley have yet to be
offered for public comment by the Fed,
and none of the law’s provisions have
undergone “trial by fire.”  Under-
A number of relatively
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marketplace during the Great
Depression. With the passage of the
Financial Modernization Act of 1999
and the implementation of the FHC
structure, that process took a big step
forward.
What will the financial
services industry look like in the future?
It is hard to say, but there is some
agreement — at least in broad strokes.
There will surely be a handful of
financial behemoths offering one-stop
shopping to businesses and consumers.
Their outlines and their names seem to
be emerging daily.
          Beyond these few that will
attempt to be all things to all people, a
large number of institutions will remain.
These may be described as niche
players, which will choose to
concentrate on either a geographic area
or a product set. In their chosen market
segment, they will remain credible, even
fierce competitors. Single-product
providers, such as credit card and
mortgage servicing companies, will
remain. Community banks will still be
effective competitors, both in markets
for small-business lending and
personalized consumer service. These
smaller banks are quick to adjust to
changes in customer needs, and they
will be able to compete effectively as
well.
          In sho rt, the future holds more
innovation for firms of all sizes. The
needs of customers, be they individuals
or organizations, will continue to evolve,
and financial service providers will, as
always, adapt to meet their needs.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley recognizes that
this is the nature of the marketplace.
Those who find ways to seize the
opportunities this law offers will benefit
in the financial marketplace of the
future and will be the first to reap the
rewards.
standably, the rules that the Federal
Reserve has offered for comment are
being scrutinized for indications of the
Fed’s intent and its appreciation of
industry conditions.
This was made abundantly
clear by the reaction to the proposed
rule that bank holding companies’
merchant banking activity should be
subject to a 50 percent capital charge.
The comment period worked as
intended — and the Federal Reserve
substantially altered the rule — but the
episode undoubtedly left some lingering
apprehension.
Another important step toward
implementing Gramm-Leach-Bliley was
taken in early May when the Board of
Governors announced that it was
seeking comment on the long-awaited
Regulation W. This proposed rule seeks
to implement section 23 A and B of the
Federal Reserve Act and to define
permissible transactions between a bank
and its affiliates. In the post financial
modernization world, bank affiliations
can and do extend to many kinds of
institutions. Protecting insured deposits
from improper transfer to an affiliate is
vital to the safety and soundness of our
national economy and one of the key
functions of this regulation.
Following enactment of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, implementing
regulations for section 23 A and B
became more possible and more
necessary. But despite a basis in
precedent, Regulation W is as complex
and detailed as any federal regulation
proposed in recent years. Comments
were due August 15, and the input of
affected organizations will be
constructive and useful in determining
the final form of this landmark
regulation.
I also believe that the industry
is interested in how relationships among
regulatory agencies will unfold in this
new environment. The Federal
Reserve’s new role as umbrella supervisor
of financial holding companies is similar
to its role in supervising bank holding
companies. However, the Fed’s future
success entails increased communi-
cation, cooperation, and coordination
with the many supervisors of the more-
diversified financial holding companies.
As the Fed begins redefining its working
relationship with other regulators, it will
answer many of the questions of
importance to securities and insurance-
based firms.
As we develop the rules and
refine the regulators’ roles in the
financial holding company, I believe
that FHCs will emerge as entities with
the flexibility and functionality to meet
the demands of the marketplace
without unnecessary or onerous
regulatory burden. As this becomes
clear, I expect the number of financial
firms electing to establish financial
holding companies will increase.
At the start of this article, I
said that financial modernization is not a
single event or law, but rather a
relentless process of eroding the
constraints placed on the financial
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